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I. INTRODUCTION
It must be acknowledged that the aircrewman considered
as a subsystem may be the strongest and the weakest link in
the overall aircraft system. It is understandable that
versatile, flexible man capable of internal reprograming and
learning was a strong link in the early, more simple aircraft
systems. In comparison to modern aircraft, these systems
were limited in such areas as speed, altitude and acceleration
Under these conditions and state of the art it was possible
to put man into the system as an operator with no special
consideration for his efficiency or human frailties. Even
at decreased efficiency pilots were able to operate these
aircraft satisfactorily; although safety experts would pro-
bably agree that this approach accounted for innumerable
aircraft accidents.
At the same time, the weak link is the performance un-
reliability, i.e. humans cannot perform the same task in the
same manner time and time again. Man also has weaknesses in
psychological and physiological aspects; some of which are
not at all well understood. Any part of the system which
aggravates or intensifies these weaknesses ultimately will
decrease the efficiency of the entire system.
While it may be argued that man slowly develops some
improvement in his performance, the hardware advances in
the aircraft industry have made quantum advances in the
last decade or two. The hardware and system can now perform
8

in regions where the pilot is incapable of operating or
controlling the aircraft. For instance, this point was
reached some time ago in the acceleration field where air-
craft became capable of sustaining four or more "G" acceler-
ations. This resulted in the pilot's "G" suit which increased
man's tolerance to acceleration stress significantly. However,
present aircraft design configurations are capable of providing
accelerations that again will exceed human tolerances. In
the information field, comparing a World War II aircraft with
a present day aircraft quickly reveals a significant increase
in both quantity of data and the rate of data flow. At
times, this data is well past the pilot's mental information
processing capacities, hence on board computers are often
included to assist in the processing of systems data and
environmental information. The quantum increase in informa-
tion available and the commensuate rate of flow is, in the
author's opinion, certainly one of the main factors forcing
the military to allocate a minimum of two crew members per
aircraft. In addition, a considerable research effort has
been, and is, now underway concerning the display and pro-
cessing of this information in an effort to allow the
human to remain an effective link in the modern airborne
system.
Supplementing mission effectiveness and inexorably
intertwined with overall efficiency is the safety aspect.
There is little doubt that the aircrew subsystem is a weak
link in this area. Depending on the criteria for accident
causality, approximately 60% of naval aircraft accidents
9

have been attributed to the aircrew subsystem. Naturally,
naval aviation is not the only organization with this problem
The army has attributed 80% of its aviation accidents to the
aircrew subsystem with attendant loss of fifty-eight million
dollars per year (Rickelson, Kennamore and Callen, 1975).
The point is that the aviator must be considered as a
subsystem from design through planning and into operation.
The aircrew subsystem performance improvement must rate the
same priority as hardware if the total system performance is
to be maintained or improved. One major area within the
human subsystem which can be improved is the man-machine
interface. That this has been at least partly recognized is
shown by the increased utilization and rise in influence of





There is considerable research presently being conducted
in the area of cockpit design as far as new methods of in-
strumentation, display and control are concerned. Skovholt
,
et al (1971) and Kastner and Soderquist (1964) give examples
of the types of research studies and testing that appear to
be pushing the state of the art in certain of the above
areas. Unfortunately, however, it appears that the Navy does
less than it could in coordinating and optimizing cockpit
design either to remedy previous problems or to determine
the best use of newly produced hardware. The Naval Air
Development Center (NADC) report of 22 May 1974 is one of
the first documented attempts by the Navy using its own
human factors engineers to design a cockpit. The result was
a mandatory specification for the lamps MK III H-2/SR
helicopter which not only complies with general specifica-
tions and standards but takes into account more optimal in-
strument groupings and configurations using past helicopter
cockpits as references. Hopefully, this will ensure that
the human element in the system will be able to operate with
increased efficiency.
Atkins (1969) made an effort to pinpoint the problems in




"The majority of crew systems problems are
induced at the initial design and development stage;
consequently, the establishment of sound design
philosophy supported by realistic and complete
design requirements is mandatory if truly adequate
crew systems are to be made the rule rather than
the exception."
Atkins (1969) discovered very early that many of the
design problems could be measured quantitatively; however,
it was difficult to make definitive statements concerning
standards and specifications because they were considered
inadequate to define sufficient criteria for deficiency
documentation. This resulted in a major effort to define
standards and specifications which should be promulgated.
Nine new military standards were recommended by Atkins
(1969) as shown by the documents outlined by dashed lines
in Table I. It appears that four have essentially been
implemented and are in use today. These four correspond to:









Presently, cockpit design in naval aircraft, except for
lamps, MK III H-2/SR, appears to be left primarily to the
contractor. This system relies primarily on the contractors'
human factors personnel in conjuction with general specifica-
tions and standards to ensure efficient design. There seems
to be little, if any, common data based on typical prevalent
















previous aircraft and experience. Certainly the Navy does
commit substantial resources to improving cockpits and seems
to be showing increasing interest in human factors engineer-
ing including the man-machine interface. The Navy generally
becomes actively involved for the first time when a prototype
cockpit is provided by the contractor or built by NADC
Warminster. In neither of these places are there sufficient
fleet aviators for user input nor researchers with adequate
time to thoroughly check the entire cockpit. At the prototype
stage a major change requires the equivalent of an Engineer-
ing Change Proposal (ECP) with all its consequential expense
and delay. The Naval Air Test Center (NATC) is even further
down stream in the development cycle. At NATC, a highly
qualified, knowledgeable group of fleet pilots have a chance
to evaluate the cockpit. Unfortunately, too often NATC test
pilots must rely on a limited resource base in terms of time,
aircraft and number of test pilots to determine deficiencies.
Any deficiencies found must again go the expensive and
time-consuming design change route. These procedures have
generally caught most of the "critical" cockpit problems and
"urgent" changes are made. However, every aircraft gets to
the fleet with a number of known "less than urgent" problems
which fleet aircrewmen must live with. In many cases these
deficiencies last throughout the life span of the aircraft.
Even more distressing is the carry-over of similar deficien-
cies between types and generations of aircraft. There is no
centralized comprehensive data bank cockpit deficiencies nor
has there been any attempt to determine commonality of
14

deficiencies across different manufacturers and mission
communities.
To obtain a broad data bank of deficiencies is not an
easy task. Atkins (1969) collected information from a broad
range of sources including safety and unsatisfactory reports
and concluded that none were as comprehensive, easy to get or
as valuable as aircrew generated data.
Atkins (1969) was the only attempt that the author was
able to locate in which substantial user data was generated
and used. Too often, it seems, the user of an equipment is
not sufficiently utilized in determining design and efficien-
cy requirements. Naval aircraft cockpits would seem to fall
in this category. To include the user in studies, unfortu-
nately, is very often a costly and time-consuming procedure.
In summary, this study considers the user (military
aircrewmen) as an outstanding, presently untapped, source of
information about deficiencies in the cockpit man-machine
interface. The author claims the aircrewman is part of a
subsystem in which improvements in efficiency/safety will
pay large dividends in overall system improvements. To this
end, answers were attempted for the following questions:
1. Does the fleet aircrewman consider that man-machine
interface problems exist in naval aircraft cockpits?
2. If so, can these problems be articulated adequately
for systematic study?
3. How serious are these problems?





The availability of a relatively large, professional and
recently proficient group of fleet pilots from all types of
aircraft and covering the entire range of mission communities
is a tremendous asset. The U.S. Naval Aviation Safety School
at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS) Monterey, California,
provides this asset. Classes of from twenty to forty Naval
Aviators/Naval Flight Officers (NFO) complete the safety
course every six weeks. This source was used as the data base
in the present study. It would, of course, be possible to
get a large data base on any specific aircraft by polling
pilots at a naval air station where that specific aircraft
was found. The present study, however, is more interested
in a broad variety of aircraft and the relationships between
cockpits of many aircraft. Thus the safety school student
population is not only less expensive to use, but also is
optimal for variety. The only disadvantage is the relatively
slow accumulation of data.
A. COLLECTION OF DATA
It was decided to employ the critical incident technique
as the method to gather data from the aircrewmen (Flanagan,
1962). This technique usually calls for determining both
good and bad criteria. However, for the sake of brevity,
this study gathered data only on deficiencies. It may in-
deed be true that an attempt to gather data necessary to
16

reinforce good design criteria would have as much benefit as
the correction of deficiencies. However, based on the author's
experience, it was felt that pilots can generally recall pro-
blems better than individual items of good design.
A four-page questionnaire was designed based on the crit-
ical incident technique using both open ended questions and
a section where the problems could be categorized both by
criticality and type of problem. Appendix A represents a
sample of the questionnaire as given to the first two groups
of subjects.
Appendix B shows the instructions which were read ver-
batim to the group prior to filling out the questionnaire.
Each group had about forty-five minutes to complete the
questionnaire.
After preliminary analysis of the first two group's data,
pages three and four were deleted for reasons explained
later. The third group completed only pages one and two of
Appendix A.
Flanagan (1962) claimed that data collection could stop
when one hundred questionnaires resulted in only two or
three new items of information. Based on this criteria,
there is a great amount of untapped information in this data
source. This study is expected to be only a preliminary
effort. Data collection is expected to continue with sub-
sequent classes of the safety school and all raw data will be
retained by the Operations Research, Human Factors Laboratory
of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. A fourth safety school
class has already been polled, but too late for the data to
17

be included in this study.
B. ANALYSIS OF DATA
An item hereinafter is defined to mean a single gripe or
writeup on a questionnaire. A deficiency is an aircraft
problem, i.e., a single deficiency may be referenced by more
than one item. It was anticipated that the major analysis
would be directed into the following two items.
1. Classification by Aircraft Type
All items were collected and displayed by aircraft
type, i.e., A-4 , F-14, etc.
2. Major Deficiency Categories
Primary thrust of the study was to determine if there
was a commonality of deficiencies among aircraft and across
communities. Using the deficiencies in individual aircraft
as a basis, it was desired to determine a major deficiency





The response from the first three safety school classes
was enthusiastic and produced 213 items from 94 respondents.
The raw questionnaire information was divided and displayed
by type of aircraft. Items were reported on 21 aircraft in
the final analysis. This is an excellent indication of the
breadth of experience of the safety school students and
certainly gave the wide aircraft and community sample that
was desired. Table II shows the data broken down by type of
aircraft, the respondent status (aviator or NFO) with the
number of total items presented by both type of aircrewman
and gives an indication of the respondents experience level.
The column labeled "simulator" shows the total number of
deficiencies that, in the author's opinion, a full scale
simulator study by human factors engineers would have dis-
covered.
As expected, this effort resulting in 213 items spread
over 21 aircraft left many aircraft with very few items,
hence the major analysis effort went into the ten aircraft
with the largest data base. These aircraft were the A-4
,
A-5, A-6, A-7, F-4, F-14, S-2 , S-3, P-3 and the E-2.
Fortunately this included the newly operational fixed wing
aircraft. The fact that an aircraft had few deficiencies
and was not listed here is not as might be hoped, because
the aircraft was free of deficiencies, but was, rather, be-
cause of a lack of respondents in that community. Of the
19
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ten aircraft with the most data, there were 172 items reported
from 75 respondents or 2.29 items per respondent. Of the
remaining aircraft there were only 41 items but from only
19 respondents for 2.16 items per respondent. It appears
that an aircrewman of any aircraft could, on the average,
recall and document 2.27 deficiencies during the test period.
Attempts to analyze Section IV of the questionnaire
failed (see Appendix A). The respondents were unable to
satisfactorily correlate their items in human factors cate-
gories without greatly enlarging the explanatory material.
The choice of categories appeared unfortunate in that the
categories used were related to categories in MIL-STD 1472B.
In the final outcome these categories were not particularly
useful. Fortunately, the open ended questions of Section III
elicited excellent information which appeared to be complete
and unambiguous (see Appendix A). Under these circumstances,
Section IV added little information and was considered of
little value in the current effort. Section V of Appendix A
also did not provide the expected information. Respondent
ratings for the same deficiency varied across the whole
spectrum of criticality. This aborted the attempt to assign
a criticality or importance to a given deficiency. However,
this portion of the effort did lead the author to speculate
that rather than using a range of criticality for human
factors man-machine interface deficiencies, two classes of
deficiency could be used. These classes could be directly




These are problems which become known to high authority
because of an accident /incident or are detected by test and
evaluation activities and are recognized as extremely likely
to cause an incident/accident. This class of discrepancies
is generally remedied on a priority basis often at great
cost and sometimes while the whole fleet of aircraft is
administratively grounded pending appropriate action.
B. ALL OTHER DEFICIENCIES
These deficiencies are often known, but due to time and
money constraints and their apparent unimportance, they re-
main uncorrected. These are the ones the fleet user "lives
with." The great majority of items reported in this study
are of this type. Unfortunately, the human element is mixed
with these deficiencies and hence the outcome of mixing these
deficiencies with the human variability in any given situation
may well lead to an accident /incident at some future time.
If this occurs, the deficiency may well graduate to the
"urgent' category.
Section VI of Appendix A was little used by the re-
spondents and was also considered unnecessary.
In any case, Sections IV, V and VI of the questionnaire
were deleted after the second group was polled. This left




The deficiencies must be treated with great caution due
to the present lack of verification. It remains for a field
team with access to the individual aircraft to quantitatively
verify these deficiencies prior to final determination. The
fact that so many items are reported by so many respondents
lends credence to the existence of the problems. Yet sub-
stantial field work remains to be done. Verification would
apply to such areas as measurement of: cockpit geometry;
control forces and displacement and display parameters.




There will always be a few minor isolated gripes
that may never be repeated and possibly are just a function
of the individual. As the data base increases, many of
these will be duplicated and move into Class B.
2. Repeat Deficiencies
This group of deficiencies consistently reappears
among independent respondents. Often the same deficiency
occurs in different aircraft and from different communities.
This class is considered very significant even though un-
verified quantitatively by field measurements. The author
feels that these deficiencies are extremely real and warrant
serious consideration.
Table III shows the frequency distribution of discrep-
ancies. For example, the A-4 aircraft has 31 items reported;
16 were not duplicated. Two deficiencies had two respondents




FREQUENCY OF DEFICIENCIES BY AIRCRAFT TYPE
TYPE AIRCRAFT TOTAL ITEMS NO OF DEFICIENCIES WITH FREQUENCY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A-4 31 16 2 1 1
RA-5 16 13 1
A-6 19 8 3 1
A-7 17 15 1
F-4 33 13 3 2 2
F-8 3 3
F-14 8 6 1
S-2 7 5 1
S-3 5 5
P-3 21 13 1 2














respondents and one deficiency had 7 respondents reporting.
The attempt to determine broad problem categories which
dominated individual discrepancies led to twelve broad cate-
gories. To qualify a category must have deficiencies which
were duplicated in a single aircraft and/or which occured in
more than one aircraft. The overall categories into which so
many of these deficiencies fit were subjectively derived but
are human factors oriented and quickly recognizable by avi-
ation personnel.
Table IV shows the twelve major problem categories which
included 111 of the 213 items. That is, 50% of the items
could be conglomerated into twelve major categories.
The first column lists the broad deficiency category
followed by the type aircraft that had problems in this
category. The "components" column is a description in ab-
breviated aviation terminology of the type of equipment which
was involved, if applicable. The final column lists the
total items cited in that deficiency category by type air-
craft. These are the major problems which irritate or annoy
pilots and at worst, cause the lack of efficiency or inability
to perform which may result in accidents. Most of these
items are self-explanatory and will be easily recognized
by an aviator. Almost all of these items are susceptible to
being detected by a good cockpit simulator. Item 12 is not
really within the scope of the man-machine problem; it is
just presented as a potentially interesting sidelight on
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The author concluded that
:
1. Aviators do feel that there are substantial numbers of
man-machine interface problems in naval aircraft cockpits.
2. Aviators can articulate and document these problems
quite well.
3. The Navy does not sufficiently utilize the assets of the
fleet aircrew community data in design study and testing.
4. The continuation of many of these deficiencies (circuit
breaker panels, scan patterns, inability to reach or
see) from one generation to the next leads to the con-
clusion that either
a. the Navy does not recognize these deficiencies or
b. does not consider them important or
c. has not devised a suitable method of systemat-
ically ensuring that new cockpits do not repeat
the same deficiencies of the older aircraft.
5. Two alternatives to improvement of naval aircraft cockpits
might be considered:
a. continue to allow the industrial contractor to
design cockpits. If this alternative is chosen
the following areas need attention:
1. There must be a significant and continu-
ing amplification, clarification and





2. A realistic, enforceable system must be
implemented to prevent violating, omit-
ting or otherwise disregarding specifi-
cations and standards,
b. The Navy must get more involved with its own
human factors personnel in research and design
in an effort not only to help in advancing the
state of the art, but to gain greater control




It is recommended that:
The Navy consider devoting more resources to the in-
house human factors oriented effort to substantially improve
the aircrew subsystem by improving design of man-machine
interfaces.
Further recommendations are as follows:
1. Study cockpit deficiencies exhaustively and quantitatively
to determine if these deficiencies are due to violations
or lack of specifications and standards.
2. A Navy developed aircrew station specification should be
developed specifically for each aircraft proposed.
3. The long range solution is to improve the aircrew sub-
system by initiating a Crewstation Research Center sim-
ilar to the NASA AMES, cockpit simulator at NAS Moffett
Field, California. The proposed simulator need not be
overly extensive in its motion capabilities, but should
be such that computer support and man-machine system
performance data recording capabilities are available.
It should have a strong human factors staff and easy
access to large numbers of fleet aircrewmen for use as
test subjects. Ideally this simulator would be capable
of essentially complete duplication of any existing or
potential cockpit. Specifically, dimensions, panels,
instrumentation, lighting and seat configurations must
be capable of being easily changed, removed or modified.
32

4. If the above cockpit research center were put in opera-
tion, the final result might possibly be a standardized
cockpit of optimal dimensions, instrument panels, con-
soles and equipment based on ongoing and continual re-
search and testing of fleet pilots. Such a cockpit
should be quite susceptible to very stringent specifica-
tions and standards and could form the basis for a Navy





COCKPIT HUMAN FACTORS DEFICIENCY QUESTIONNAIRE
SECTION I - RESPONDENT DATA
Date
Llot NFO (check one)
total Flight time
iircraft flown most in last 6 months. Type Hours
)o you think the data we are trying to get is available elsewhere? Yes No
If yes, where?
SECTION II - IDENTIFICATION OR DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY
.SAMPLE ITEM 1 ITEM 2 ITEM 3
Cype(s) of aircraft involved
'lame of deficient item
Component ID (id: known)
•lanufacturer (if known)
Vas this item/situation standard? Yes No
i.e. Did it occur on all aircraft in type?
If NO, describe below
SECTION III - BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE SITUATION AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS
34

APPENDIX A - continued
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APPENDIX A - continued
SECTION IV - PROBLEM CATEGORY
Design criteria are well established in MIL-STANDARD 1472B so we expect
any problems to be related to the following areas. Please check the area that
is applicable. If more than one category is applicable, mark in order of
importance by 1, 2, 3, etc.
SAMPLE ITEM 1 ITEM 2 ITEM 3
VISUAL DISPLAY relating to seeing, light, dark
scan problems, range of view vibration, etc.
AUDIO DISPLAY relating to hearing, background
noise, discrimination, tone, frequency, etc.
CONTROL: Stick, throttle, knob, switch, actuator
LABELLING: Unclear, misplaced, size, color, etc.
WORKSPACE: Size, shape, access, position, etc.
ENVIRONMENT: Heat, light humidity, noise, etc.
DESIGN FOR MAINTAINABILITY: If required, can it
be fixed. Fuses, light, modules, etc.
HAZARDS AND SAFETY: Sharp edges, shock, guards
SECTION V - POTENTIAL EFFECTS
On a scale of 1 to 5 (l=minor, 5- Very serious)
What are the potential effects of this problem under the following conditions?
1. Normal Operations
2. Worst case (i.e. What is the worst you ever saw or heard of happening?

















APPENDIX A - continued
SECTION VI - FINAL COMMENTS
Now that we have asked some leading questions, if you have any further comments








INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILLING OUT THE COCKPIT HUMAN FACTORS
DEFICIENCY QUESTIONNAIRE
There is presently no large data base, from the pilot's
point of view, for problems that the pilot faces caused by
the cockpit and its equipment. It may be too late or ex-
pensive to change the specific items or address specific
problems that relate to known deficiencies today. However,
the hope is that a data base made up of such problems,
statistically relevant and properly presented in the DESIGN
stage of tomorrow's cockpits may save us from having these
same or similar problems on our next tour.
The number and date are for statistical purposes only
and have been filled out by the instructor. Since the ques-
tionnaires have been randomly distributed, you may anonymously
speak your mind.
Please operate independently, since if all the P-3
drivers come up with the same item it will tell us one thing
(which we don't want). If you all come up with a different
item, that will tell us something also.
It is anticipated that 95% of the items will be UNCLASS,
however, if the item you wish to relate is classified, please
so mark your questionnaire and personally let me know so that
the special markings and handling may be complied with.
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Now specifically, think back on your last flight
experiences and remember some cockpit piece of equipment,
murphy, or design feature that was a problem (couldn't
reach, see, feel, hear, actuate, etc.) Almost any specific
item that caused some difficulty, lack of coordination,
hazard, noise, temperature, etc. will be helpful. If you
have two or three, so much the better. Space is provided
for three items.
Everybody got an item? If not, keep thinking back on
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